Islamic Propagation Office of Qom Seminary, Khorasan Razavi Branch Journal of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence 2476-7565 10 1 2024 05 21 Analyzing the Uṣūlī Published Works about Imām Khumaynī on Authenticity of the Custom of Rational Persons Analyzing the Uṣūlī Published Works about Imām Khumaynī on Authenticity of the Custom of Rational Persons 7 35 75944 10.22034/jrj.2024.66461.2659 FA Amin Azimi Graduate of the Doctoral Degree in Jurisprudence and Fundamentals of Islamic Law at Tehran University; Tehran, Iran (Corresponding Author); Sohrab Moghadami Shahidani Qom University of Islamic Education Journal Article 2023 05 19 Undoubtedly, Imām Khumaynī (RA) has been a pioneer in using the Custom of Rational Persons (Sīrat al-ʻUqalā) as one of the main elements of developing jurisprudence. However, the research conducted on his uṣūlī views on this issue has various interpretations of which the purpose of this study is to criticize and analyze the presented interpretations and analyzes especially in the published works of the Institute for Editing and Publishing the Works of Imām Khumaynī (RA) in two pillars, the type of authenticity and the scope of authenticity. Researching this issue is aimed at providing a new explanation from Imām Khumaynī’s point of view about the two areas mentioned in the Custom of Rational Persons, which is free from any hypertextual and selective interpretation and carried out with library search tools. Unlike other studies, each of which has chosen inherent authenticity or endorsed authenticity, the research of this study which is done by descriptive-analytical method shows that, firstly, in the issue of authentication, rational indications (ʻimārāt ʻuqalāī) have inherent authenticity and non-realistic attitudes (sīrah) need endorsed authenticity (ḥujjīyat al-imḍāī). Secondly, the authenticity of the newly-emerged attitudes also has special conditions in his view, which are rarely fulfilled, and the absolute attribution of their authenticity to Imām Khumaynī (RA) is wrong. Undoubtedly, Imām Khumaynī (RA) has been a pioneer in using the Custom of Rational Persons (Sīrat al-ʻUqalā) as one of the main elements of developing jurisprudence. However, the research conducted on his uṣūlī views on this issue has various interpretations of which the purpose of this study is to criticize and analyze the presented interpretations and analyzes especially in the published works of the Institute for Editing and Publishing the Works of Imām Khumaynī (RA) in two pillars, the type of authenticity and the scope of authenticity. Researching this issue is aimed at providing a new explanation from Imām Khumaynī’s point of view about the two areas mentioned in the Custom of Rational Persons, which is free from any hypertextual and selective interpretation and carried out with library search tools. Unlike other studies, each of which has chosen inherent authenticity or endorsed authenticity, the research of this study which is done by descriptive-analytical method shows that, firstly, in the issue of authentication, rational indications (ʻimārāt ʻuqalāī) have inherent authenticity and non-realistic attitudes (sīrah) need endorsed authenticity (ḥujjīyat al-imḍāī). Secondly, the authenticity of the newly-emerged attitudes also has special conditions in his view, which are rarely fulfilled, and the absolute attribution of their authenticity to Imām Khumaynī (RA) is wrong.

http://jostar-fiqh.maalem.ir/article_75944_52fc793733dbb17118c9a1f4da365434.pdf

Islamic Propagation Office of Qom Seminary, Khorasan Razavi Branch Journal of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence 2476-7565 10 1 2024 05 21 Principality of Conventional Nature in Matters of Legal Rulings: A Method of Inferring the Newly Emerged Issues Principality of Conventional Nature in Matters of Legal Rulings: A Method of Inferring the Newly Emerged Issues 37 66 76069 10.22034/jrj.2023.65571.2591 FA Mohammad Ali Khademi Kosha Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy Mohammed Hussain Mullah Mirzaei A graduate of Qom seminary Akbar Najjm Howzeh Journal Article 2022 12 26 Nowadays, there is, sometimes, an example of the title of the matter of the religious ruling (ḥukm al-sharʻī), which lacks its customary nature, such as the old dirham and dinar in the current era. Other times, it is the other way around, such as coins that have the customary nature of dirhams and dinars but are not examples of their titles. For jurisprudential inferences in such cases, according to the principle of following rulings from the titles, is the validity (ṣidq) of the matter’s titles the criterion of the ruling or their customary nature? The answer to this question can open a new way of inferring jurisprudential rulings on newly-emerged issues. By explaining the need to pay attention to the customary nature before the literal meaning, this study states that in inferring religious rulings from verbal evidence, the basic principle is to pay attention to the customary nature of the matters, which should be examined in order to find it by using conventional evidence and after despairing of knowing the conventional nature, attention should be paid to the literal meaning of the words. The principle of customary nature, which is the main innovation of the study, firstly, prevents holding on fast to the literal meaning before examining the customary nature. Secondly, it determines the will of customary nature in cases of doubt about the will of the literal meaning and customary nature. Thirdly, it is a rule in applying the principle of ‘following the rulings to the titles.’ The important result of the principle of customary nature is revealed in inferring the verdict of newly emerged issues. In cases where their subject matter lacks title validity (ṣidq al-ʻunwānī) but has the customary nature of rulings’ matters. For example, if the customary nature of dirhams and dinars can be determined in religious rulings, today’s money, which has the nature of dirhams and dinars from a customary point of view, will be subject to the rulings of dirhams and dinars. On the other hand, matters that today have the title validity but do not have the former customary nature, such as the old dirham and dinar in the current era, cannot have the former ruling. Nowadays, there is, sometimes, an example of the title of the matter of the religious ruling (ḥukm al-sharʻī), which lacks its customary nature, such as the old dirham and dinar in the current era. Other times, it is the other way around, such as coins that have the customary nature of dirhams and dinars but are not examples of their titles. For jurisprudential inferences in such cases, according to the principle of following rulings from the titles, is the validity (ṣidq) of the matter’s titles the criterion of the ruling or their customary nature? The answer to this question can open a new way of inferring jurisprudential rulings on newly-emerged issues. By explaining the need to pay attention to the customary nature before the literal meaning, this study states that in inferring religious rulings from verbal evidence, the basic principle is to pay attention to the customary nature of the matters, which should be examined in order to find it by using conventional evidence and after despairing of knowing the conventional nature, attention should be paid to the literal meaning of the words. The principle of customary nature, which is the main innovation of the study, firstly, prevents holding on fast to the literal meaning before examining the customary nature. Secondly, it determines the will of customary nature in cases of doubt about the will of the literal meaning and customary nature. Thirdly, it is a rule in applying the principle of ‘following the rulings to the titles.’ The important result of the principle of customary nature is revealed in inferring the verdict of newly emerged issues. In cases where their subject matter lacks title validity (ṣidq al-ʻunwānī) but has the customary nature of rulings’ matters. For example, if the customary nature of dirhams and dinars can be determined in religious rulings, today’s money, which has the nature of dirhams and dinars from a customary point of view, will be subject to the rulings of dirhams and dinars. On the other hand, matters that today have the title validity but do not have the former customary nature, such as the old dirham and dinar in the current era, cannot have the former ruling.

http://jostar-fiqh.maalem.ir/article_76069_381b9e3f9c94f6535e7123d696628e86.pdf

Islamic Propagation Office of Qom Seminary, Khorasan Razavi Branch Journal of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence 2476-7565 10 1 2024 05 21 Preservation of Non-Islamic Tangible Cultural Heritage from the Perspective of Imāmī Jurisprudence Preservation of Non-Islamic Tangible Cultural Heritage from the Perspective of Imāmī Jurisprudence 67 109 76068 10.22034/jrj.2024.68698.2793 FA Mojtaba Eerfanian Moghbeli Fourth-Level Student at Mashhad Seminary ; Mashhad -Iran. Mojtaba Elahi Khorasani Department of Jurisprudence, Akhund Khorasani Specialty Center of Islamic Propagation Office of Qom Seminary, Khorasan Razavi Branch Seyyed Mohsen Fattahi Associate Professor School of Women and Family, University of Religions and Religions, Qom-Iran Journal Article 2024 03 13 Part of the tangible cultural heritage in the history of Iran and other Islamic countries arises from non-Islamic culture. Sometimes, it is at a point of conflict with Islamic teachings. Such as the Chogha Zanbil ziggurat (the place of an Elamite goddess), the statue of the fertility goddess Venus and Buddha statues (idols), and Achaemenid gold cups (rhytons). Therefore, the proper preservation of this heritage has been questioned by Islamic jurists and some sects and extremist currents in Islamic countries, by holding on fast to principles such as the sanctity of misleading (iẓlāl), promoting false beliefs and cooperating on sin and enmity, demand not to pay attention to this heritage, rather they are trying to take practical action to destroy them. Using a descriptive and analytical method, this study tries to explain its ruling based on Imāmīyyah jurisprudence by examining and criticizing the proofs of the prohibition and permissibility of preserving this heritage and finding out whether the preservation of tangible non-Islamic cultural heritage and actions related to it is prohibited or permissible and rather preferred or obligatory? It is clear that in the latter case, the Islamic government will be obliged to plan and enact laws to preserve and promote these heritages, and will also be obliged to spend the public treasury for this purpose. The findings of the study show that the evidence of prohibition has no scientific justification and that the generalities and absolutes of the jurisprudential evidence and explicit proofs that order to take lessons from these heritages prove the permissibility and rather the priority and even in some cases the obligation of preserving them. Part of the tangible cultural heritage in the history of Iran and other Islamic countries arises from non-Islamic culture. Sometimes, it is at a point of conflict with Islamic teachings. Such as the Chogha Zanbil ziggurat (the place of an Elamite goddess), the statue of the fertility goddess Venus and Buddha statues (idols), and Achaemenid gold cups (rhytons). Therefore, the proper preservation of this heritage has been questioned by Islamic jurists and some sects and extremist currents in Islamic countries, by holding on fast to principles such as the sanctity of misleading (iẓlāl), promoting false beliefs and cooperating on sin and enmity, demand not to pay attention to this heritage, rather they are trying to take practical action to destroy them. Using a descriptive and analytical method, this study tries to explain its ruling based on Imāmīyyah jurisprudence by examining and criticizing the proofs of the prohibition and permissibility of preserving this heritage and finding out whether the preservation of tangible non-Islamic cultural heritage and actions related to it is prohibited or permissible and rather preferred or obligatory? It is clear that in the latter case, the Islamic government will be obliged to plan and enact laws to preserve and promote these heritages, and will also be obliged to spend the public treasury for this purpose. The findings of the study show that the evidence of prohibition has no scientific justification and that the generalities and absolutes of the jurisprudential evidence and explicit proofs that order to take lessons from these heritages prove the permissibility and rather the priority and even in some cases the obligation of preserving them.

http://jostar-fiqh.maalem.ir/article_76068_dcbc1bb8b01e7356dcc0d6f17cc7d525.pdf

Islamic Propagation Office of Qom Seminary, Khorasan Razavi Branch Journal of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence 2476-7565 10 1 2024 05 21 Challenges of Referring to Weakening Religion in the Process of Jurisprudential Inference Challenges of Referring to Weakening Religion in the Process of Jurisprudential Inference 111 138 75984 10.22034/jrj.2024.66436.2652 FA Mohammad Taghi Fakhlaei Professor Department of Jurisprudence Faculty of Theology Ferdowsi University Of Mashhad. Hasan Hosseiniyar PhD student of Fiqh and Fundamentals of Islamic Law at Ferdowsi University of Mashhad Alireza Abedi Sarasiya Assistant Professor, Department of Education, Faculty of Theology, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad; Mashhad-Iran. a-abedi@um.ac.ir Journal Article 2023 06 12 Weakening the religion, which means a ruling or behaviour that makes religion look weak and frivolous in the eyes of society’s custom, is one of the titles that after the Islamic revolution was first seriously considered and cited in Imam Khumaynī’s fatwās. Then, in many issues, it is the basis and proof of contemporary fatwās, so that the prohibition of weakening the religion can be mentioned as a principle of jurisprudence. Weakening religion as a secondary has the capacity of planning in the form of a jurisprudential principle. However, not paying attention to the challenging effects of referring to weakening the religion in the process of jurisprudential inference has caused the use of weakening the religion in the process of jurisprudential inference to be accompanied by doubts. Using the descriptive and analytical method, this study aims to correctly explain challenges such as the incompatibility of the principle of weakening the religion with the principle of stability of rulings, or the contradiction of the necessity of firmness in the implementation of religious rules by applying the rule of weakening the religion, and also by the allocation of the majority of the results of the implementation of weakening the religion. With a scientific expression, it proved the non-contradiction of weakening the religion with the mentioned cases. Weakening the religion, which means a ruling or behaviour that makes religion look weak and frivolous in the eyes of society’s custom, is one of the titles that after the Islamic revolution was first seriously considered and cited in Imam Khumaynī’s fatwās. Then, in many issues, it is the basis and proof of contemporary fatwās, so that the prohibition of weakening the religion can be mentioned as a principle of jurisprudence. Weakening religion as a secondary has the capacity of planning in the form of a jurisprudential principle. However, not paying attention to the challenging effects of referring to weakening the religion in the process of jurisprudential inference has caused the use of weakening the religion in the process of jurisprudential inference to be accompanied by doubts. Using the descriptive and analytical method, this study aims to correctly explain challenges such as the incompatibility of the principle of weakening the religion with the principle of stability of rulings, or the contradiction of the necessity of firmness in the implementation of religious rules by applying the rule of weakening the religion, and also by the allocation of the majority of the results of the implementation of weakening the religion. With a scientific expression, it proved the non-contradiction of weakening the religion with the mentioned cases.

http://jostar-fiqh.maalem.ir/article_75984_92a4a01d1763e16dd4c51edeeb25b877.pdf

Islamic Propagation Office of Qom Seminary, Khorasan Razavi Branch Journal of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence 2476-7565 10 1 2024 05 21 Feasibility of Refutation of “Unfair Terms” Based on Imāmī Jurisprudence Sources Feasibility of Refutation of “Unfair Terms” Based on Imāmī Jurisprudence Sources 139 175 76101 10.22034/jrj.2024.68501.2776 FA Mahdi Moftakhari Department of law/Mashhad branch/Islamic Azad university/Mashhad/Iran Mojtaba Zahedian Department of law/Mashhad branch/Islamic Azad university/Mashhad/Iran Sayyed Mohammad Mahdi Ghabooli Dorafshan Associate Professor, Department of Private Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad-Iran. Journal Article 2024 02 13 In recent decades, several new terms have been increasingly used in the laws and rules of Arab countries, all of which somehow indicate the unfairness of the contract (either in the nature of the contract or in the terms of the contract). One of these terms is “unfair condition.” The most important feature of unfair (taʻasufī) conditions is the exploitation and abuse of the external or internal weakness of the weak party. Iranian law has addressed the imposed or unfair conditions with delay and in a more limited way. Unfair condition is not mentioned in any jurisprudential sources, but it is possible to analyze it based on jurisprudential sources. There are two possibilities in refutation and the need to adjust the unfair terms: the correctness and refutation approach. Contractual freedom and the validity of contracts, the principle of validity and the non-inclusion of an unfair condition among refutation conditions are the evidence of the first possibility. Entering into the conditions contrary to the Holy Qurʼān and the Sunnah, the principle of justice and fairness, the prohibition of disorder in the system, the forbidding the uncertain (gharar), the forbidding of consuming property wrongfully, and the unity of the criteria with similar subjects such as al-Bayʻ ʻalā al-Bayʻ, al-Sawm ʻalā al-Sawm, Najsh and Talaqqā al-Rukbān are evidence of the second possibility. In case of refutation of an unfair terms, it is possible to dictate the possibility of termination or modification of the contract in favour of the weaker party. In recent decades, several new terms have been increasingly used in the laws and rules of Arab countries, all of which somehow indicate the unfairness of the contract (either in the nature of the contract or in the terms of the contract). One of these terms is “unfair condition.” The most important feature of unfair (taʻasufī) conditions is the exploitation and abuse of the external or internal weakness of the weak party. Iranian law has addressed the imposed or unfair conditions with delay and in a more limited way. Unfair condition is not mentioned in any jurisprudential sources, but it is possible to analyze it based on jurisprudential sources. There are two possibilities in refutation and the need to adjust the unfair terms: the correctness and refutation approach. Contractual freedom and the validity of contracts, the principle of validity and the non-inclusion of an unfair condition among refutation conditions are the evidence of the first possibility. Entering into the conditions contrary to the Holy Qurʼān and the Sunnah, the principle of justice and fairness, the prohibition of disorder in the system, the forbidding the uncertain (gharar), the forbidding of consuming property wrongfully, and the unity of the criteria with similar subjects such as al-Bayʻ ʻalā al-Bayʻ, al-Sawm ʻalā al-Sawm, Najsh and Talaqqā al-Rukbān are evidence of the second possibility. In case of refutation of an unfair terms, it is possible to dictate the possibility of termination or modification of the contract in favour of the weaker party.

http://jostar-fiqh.maalem.ir/article_76101_2880e3350077bee7c73c0973c186614b.pdf

Islamic Propagation Office of Qom Seminary, Khorasan Razavi Branch Journal of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence 2476-7565 10 1 2024 05 21 The Invalidity of Khabar al-Wāḥid as Restricted to the Transactions and Contracts The Invalidity of Khabar al-Wāḥid as Restricted to the Transactions and Contracts 177 204 76082 10.22034/jrj.2024.76082 FA Mohammadreza Kaykha Associate Professor and Faculty Member, Department of Jurisprudence and Fundamentals of Islamic Law, Sistan and Baluchestan University;Zahedan-Iran 0000-0003-3434-287x Hamid Moazzeni-bistgani Graduate PhD at Department of Jurisprudence and Foundations of Islamic Law . Zahedan-Iran; moazzeni62@gmail.com Journal Article 2022 10 29 According to the widely known viewpoint of the Uṣūlīyūn, khabar al-wāḥid (tradition with a single transmitter) is valid as a special presumption (ẓan al-khāṣ). The most important reason for its validity is considered to be the intellectuals’ attitude. But some others, citing the reason for obstruction (insidād), use akhbār al-wāhid for the absolute benefit of presumption. What needs to be discussed is whether the validity of the khabar al-wāḥid is used in the same way in both parts of worship (ʻibādīyāt) and transactions. Written in a descriptive-analytical method, this study shows that by proving the principle of non-devotional transaction rules, in its specific sense, the Akhbār al-Āḥād of these chapters are not useful for the presumption of survival (ẓan bih baqāʼ). Therefore, the proof will not be valid due to obstruction. Thus, in the chapter on transactions and contracts, Khabar al-wāḥid cannot be considered as validation either because of a specific proof or because of obstruction. Consequently, legislation in the field of transactions and contracts is the responsibility of experts (jurisprudents) and their compliance with the general purposes of the sharīʻah, such as non-ghararī (uncertain) and non-harmful. However, the usefulness of the narrations of the mentioned chapters can be indicative of the attitude and perception of the lawmaker (shāriʻ) in setting the laws of the society. As a result, the invalidity of akhbār al-āḥād will be useful for restricting transactions to contemporary transactions of maʻṣūm (infallible) and the transactions approved by him. According to the widely known viewpoint of the Uṣūlīyūn, khabar al-wāḥid (tradition with a single transmitter) is valid as a special presumption (ẓan al-khāṣ). The most important reason for its validity is considered to be the intellectuals’ attitude. But some others, citing the reason for obstruction (insidād), use akhbār al-wāhid for the absolute benefit of presumption. What needs to be discussed is whether the validity of the khabar al-wāḥid is used in the same way in both parts of worship (ʻibādīyāt) and transactions. Written in a descriptive-analytical method, this study shows that by proving the principle of non-devotional transaction rules, in its specific sense, the Akhbār al-Āḥād of these chapters are not useful for the presumption of survival (ẓan bih baqāʼ). Therefore, the proof will not be valid due to obstruction. Thus, in the chapter on transactions and contracts, Khabar al-wāḥid cannot be considered as validation either because of a specific proof or because of obstruction. Consequently, legislation in the field of transactions and contracts is the responsibility of experts (jurisprudents) and their compliance with the general purposes of the sharīʻah, such as non-ghararī (uncertain) and non-harmful. However, the usefulness of the narrations of the mentioned chapters can be indicative of the attitude and perception of the lawmaker (shāriʻ) in setting the laws of the society. As a result, the invalidity of akhbār al-āḥād will be useful for restricting transactions to contemporary transactions of maʻṣūm (infallible) and the transactions approved by him.

http://jostar-fiqh.maalem.ir/article_76082_92dbabec8e75ffb8e15c2cd28f62e3e1.pdf

Islamic Propagation Office of Qom Seminary, Khorasan Razavi Branch Journal of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence 2476-7565 10 1 2024 05 21 Inherent Validity of Rational Indications Inherent Validity of Rational Indications 205 236 75945 10.22034/jrj.2024.66617.2664 FA Rahman Saboohi P.hd in criminology and criminal Law at Qom University; Qom, Iran, Mohamad Ali Haji Dehabadi Assistant Professor of criminology and criminal Law at Qom University; Qom, Iran; (Corresponding Author) Journal Article 2023 06 20 Shame and modesty are one of the most important religious patterns of preventing sin and crime in Islamic teachings, which have been emphasized greatly. This religious model of prevention of crime in Islam is based on solid foundations such as emphasizing the human dignity of individuals, divine mercy, divine supervision, calling for the unity of the Islamic society around the axis of Oneness and Monotheism, cooperation and fanatical solidarity, and of course the spiritual dimension of shame. In the field of criminology, paying attention to shame and using it in order to rehabilitate and resocialize criminals, the main approach is the theory of accepting shame, which seeks to replace the shame of committing a criminal act instead of the shame of the criminal, in order to reform and socially accept criminality in society. The main question of this study is, what is the approach of Islamic penal jurisprudence to the shame of the re-acceptor? Using the descriptive-analytical method and library resources, this study tries to analyze the jurisprudential foundations and applications of this theory in Islamic jurisprudence and law. The findings of this study show that in addition to the above-mentioned foundations, the applications of pardon and forgiveness, repentance, hiding the crime, reconciliation between two people, restorative justice, and judge consolidation are in line with the policies of the theory of re-accepting shame in Islamic criminal jurisprudence. Shame and modesty are one of the most important religious patterns of preventing sin and crime in Islamic teachings, which have been emphasized greatly. This religious model of prevention of crime in Islam is based on solid foundations such as emphasizing the human dignity of individuals, divine mercy, divine supervision, calling for the unity of the Islamic society around the axis of Oneness and Monotheism, cooperation and fanatical solidarity, and of course the spiritual dimension of shame. In the field of criminology, paying attention to shame and using it in order to rehabilitate and resocialize criminals, the main approach is the theory of accepting shame, which seeks to replace the shame of committing a criminal act instead of the shame of the criminal, in order to reform and socially accept criminality in society. The main question of this study is, what is the approach of Islamic penal jurisprudence to the shame of the re-acceptor? Using the descriptive-analytical method and library resources, this study tries to analyze the jurisprudential foundations and applications of this theory in Islamic jurisprudence and law. The findings of this study show that in addition to the above-mentioned foundations, the applications of pardon and forgiveness, repentance, hiding the crime, reconciliation between two people, restorative justice, and judge consolidation are in line with the policies of the theory of re-accepting shame in Islamic criminal jurisprudence.

http://jostar-fiqh.maalem.ir/article_75945_573152ecf286e6632a7616ab43f08c49.pdf