Islamic Propagation Office of Qom Seminary, Khorasan Razavi Branch Journal of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence 2476-7565 11 1 2025 05 22 The Convergence of Sunnī Doctrines in the Interpretation of Shīʿah Jurisprudential Narrations The Convergence of Sunnī Doctrines in the Interpretation of Shīʿah Jurisprudential Narrations 7 34 77299 10.22034/jrj.2025.70397.2909 FA Reza Poorsedqi Director of the Principles Department of the Fiqh Center of the Holy Imams (AS), and PhD in Fiqh and Fundamentals of Law from the University of Qom, Iran Mohammad Reza Mahmudkhah Scholar at the Jurisprudential Center of the Holy Imams (AS), Qom, Iran. Journal Article 2024 11 30 Rational evidence consistently influences the semantic interpretation of textual sources. Consequently, an awareness of the historical context in which ḥadīth were issued, as well as the prevailing social conditions, can provide critical insight for accurately understanding narrations. Some scholars, emphasizing the role of transmission contexts, argue that Sunnī jurisprudential doctrines influenced the formation of Imāmī narrations, thereby framing Imāmī jurisprudence as a derivative commentary on Sunnī jurisprudence. Conversely, others entirely reject the notion that Sunnī thought shaped the interpretation of Shīʿah traditions. This study employs an analytical-critical methodology, examining textual sources and expert opinions to demonstrate that neither of these two positions is entirely defensible. Historical evidence, along with the practical approaches of jurists throughout Islamic legal history—reflecting their established intellectual traditions—suggests that recourse to Sunnī jurisprudence is necessary only in cases where an Imāmī narration is ambiguous or excessively concise, and where such reference may resolve interpretive difficulties. However, when a narration possesses an independent and coherent apparent meaning (ẓāhir), external reference becomes unnecessary. This perspective is grounded in the principle recognized by rational thinkers (ʿuqalāʾ) that the mere possibility of an alternative interpretation does not invalidate the prima facie meaning of a text. Rational evidence consistently influences the semantic interpretation of textual sources. Consequently, an awareness of the historical context in which ḥadīth were issued, as well as the prevailing social conditions, can provide critical insight for accurately understanding narrations. Some scholars, emphasizing the role of transmission contexts, argue that Sunnī jurisprudential doctrines influenced the formation of Imāmī narrations, thereby framing Imāmī jurisprudence as a derivative commentary on Sunnī jurisprudence. Conversely, others entirely reject the notion that Sunnī thought shaped the interpretation of Shīʿah traditions. This study employs an analytical-critical methodology, examining textual sources and expert opinions to demonstrate that neither of these two positions is entirely defensible. Historical evidence, along with the practical approaches of jurists throughout Islamic legal history—reflecting their established intellectual traditions—suggests that recourse to Sunnī jurisprudence is necessary only in cases where an Imāmī narration is ambiguous or excessively concise, and where such reference may resolve interpretive difficulties. However, when a narration possesses an independent and coherent apparent meaning (ẓāhir), external reference becomes unnecessary. This perspective is grounded in the principle recognized by rational thinkers (ʿuqalāʾ) that the mere possibility of an alternative interpretation does not invalidate the prima facie meaning of a text.

http://jostar-fiqh.maalem.ir/article_77299_1a7c57b1cc703718cf44e2343f387b37.pdf

Islamic Propagation Office of Qom Seminary, Khorasan Razavi Branch Journal of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence 2476-7565 11 1 2025 05 22 Examining the Challenges in Identifying Early Jurists’ Rejection (Iʿrāḍ) of Seemingly Authentic Ḥadīths Examining the Challenges in Identifying Early Jurists’ Rejection (Iʿrāḍ) of Seemingly Authentic Ḥadīths 35 66 77784 10.22034/jrj.2025.71035.2941 FA S.Mohammad Hossein Mirshahvelayati Fourth-Level Student at Qom Seminary; Qom-Iran. Mohammadkazem Rahman Setayesh Associate Professor and Faculty Member, Department of Quran and Hadith Sciences, University of Qom, Qom, Iran. Journal Article 2025 03 01 One of the primary criteria for evaluating jurisprudential traditions is analyzing religious scholars’ responses to ḥadīths. The discourse on jābirīyat (compulsory nature) and kāsirīyat (nullifying effect) of scholarly disregard (iʿrāḍ) has long occupied Imāmī jurists. According to the prevailing view among contemporary Shīʿah scholars, a ḥadīth rejected by early authorities—under certain conditions—loses credibility, as such rejection suggests potential flaws in its issuance (ṣudūr), intent (jihat al-ṣudūr), or textual indication (dilālah). Beyond theoretical debates on the validity of kāsirīyat al-iʿrāḍ, jurists face practical challenges in verifying early scholars’ disregard for seemingly authentic narrations. This study employs a library-based, descriptive-analytical approach to identify and address these methodological difficulties. Two key issues emerge: First, uncertainty regarding whether iʿrāḍ actually occurred, often stemming from later jurists’ reports about their predecessors’ positions. Second, the ijtihādī nature of such disregard—where rejection reflects a jurist’s interpretive principles rather than defects in the ḥadīth’s chain (sanad) or meaning (matn). By delineating these challenges and proposing solutions, this research aims to assist jurists in navigating iʿrāḍ-related obstacles during legal inference (istinbāṭ), thereby strengthening the process of ijtihād. Keywords: Ḥadīth Criticism, Scholarly Disregard (Iʿrāḍ), Ijtihādī Rejection, Jurisprudential Methodology, Imāmī Jurisprudence One of the primary criteria for evaluating jurisprudential traditions is analyzing religious scholars’ responses to ḥadīths. The discourse on jābirīyat (compulsory nature) and kāsirīyat (nullifying effect) of scholarly disregard (iʿrāḍ) has long occupied Imāmī jurists. According to the prevailing view among contemporary Shīʿah scholars, a ḥadīth rejected by early authorities—under certain conditions—loses credibility, as such rejection suggests potential flaws in its issuance (ṣudūr), intent (jihat al-ṣudūr), or textual indication (dilālah). Beyond theoretical debates on the validity of kāsirīyat al-iʿrāḍ, jurists face practical challenges in verifying early scholars’ disregard for seemingly authentic narrations. This study employs a library-based, descriptive-analytical approach to identify and address these methodological difficulties. Two key issues emerge: First, uncertainty regarding whether iʿrāḍ actually occurred, often stemming from later jurists’ reports about their predecessors’ positions. Second, the ijtihādī nature of such disregard—where rejection reflects a jurist’s interpretive principles rather than defects in the ḥadīth’s chain (sanad) or meaning (matn). By delineating these challenges and proposing solutions, this research aims to assist jurists in navigating iʿrāḍ-related obstacles during legal inference (istinbāṭ), thereby strengthening the process of ijtihād. Keywords: Ḥadīth Criticism, Scholarly Disregard (Iʿrāḍ), Ijtihādī Rejection, Jurisprudential Methodology, Imāmī Jurisprudence

http://jostar-fiqh.maalem.ir/article_77784_08bc7921be29d657239af8a095d07e59.pdf

Islamic Propagation Office of Qom Seminary, Khorasan Razavi Branch Journal of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence 2476-7565 11 1 2025 05 22 Investigating the nature of mining from the point of view of Shia jurisprudence Investigating the nature of mining from the point of view of Shia jurisprudence 67 97 77736 10.22034/jrj.2025.70779.2929 FA Mahdi Farhangdalir Researcher of the Higher Institute of Fiqh and Islamic Sciences Journal Article 2025 01 12 he nature of mining and the essential characteristics of mining is one of the seemingly easy issues in jurisprudential thematic issues, which is rarely discussed, and most of the jurists have only dealt with verbal or terminological definitions, they have not discussed much about the nature of mining, and the nature of mining is still It has remained ambiguous and the difference between the characteristics of mines and minerals has not been clarified.After searching for jurisprudential, lexical and customary sources and examining the characteristics that have the possibility of influencing the nature of the mine against minerals, four characteristics - "concentration of minerals with a degree of purity within a certain range, depth from the surface of the earth, high financial value of the material" "Mineral and non-earth minerals" was reviewed and the following results were obtained: Out of these four characteristics, the first and second two characteristics are the essential elements of the mine, without which the nature of the mine cannot be realized even in the mind. Although the third characteristic is directly a description of mineral materials, but indirectly, it is also considered a characteristic of a mine, and in a way, it is an existential and external description of a mine, because the density of any material does not lead to the realization of a mine outside, but it must Materials have a high financial value so that they can be mined at the place of concentration. But the fourth characteristic, "being non-earth" has neither a role in the nature of minerals nor an effect on the realization of the nature of the mine.Therefore, in the definition of a mine, it can be said that a mine is: "a place of concentration and concentration of valuable materials and elements inside the earth. he nature of mining and the essential characteristics of mining is one of the seemingly easy issues in jurisprudential thematic issues, which is rarely discussed, and most of the jurists have only dealt with verbal or terminological definitions, they have not discussed much about the nature of mining, and the nature of mining is still It has remained ambiguous and the difference between the characteristics of mines and minerals has not been clarified.After searching for jurisprudential, lexical and customary sources and examining the characteristics that have the possibility of influencing the nature of the mine against minerals, four characteristics - "concentration of minerals with a degree of purity within a certain range, depth from the surface of the earth, high financial value of the material" "Mineral and non-earth minerals" was reviewed and the following results were obtained: Out of these four characteristics, the first and second two characteristics are the essential elements of the mine, without which the nature of the mine cannot be realized even in the mind. Although the third characteristic is directly a description of mineral materials, but indirectly, it is also considered a characteristic of a mine, and in a way, it is an existential and external description of a mine, because the density of any material does not lead to the realization of a mine outside, but it must Materials have a high financial value so that they can be mined at the place of concentration. But the fourth characteristic, "being non-earth" has neither a role in the nature of minerals nor an effect on the realization of the nature of the mine.Therefore, in the definition of a mine, it can be said that a mine is: "a place of concentration and concentration of valuable materials and elements inside the earth.

http://jostar-fiqh.maalem.ir/article_77736_3d85674652a3237cfd1bba413a9afec4.pdf

Islamic Propagation Office of Qom Seminary, Khorasan Razavi Branch Journal of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence 2476-7565 11 1 2025 05 22 Comparative scientific and jurisprudential thematics of date zakat belonging with the approach of accountability jurisprudence Comparative scientific and jurisprudential thematics of date zakat belonging with the approach of accountability jurisprudence 99 123 77025 10.22034/jrj.2025.70065.2885 FA Seyyedabbas Dianatmoqaddam A graduate of the fourth level of the Qom Seminary and the head of the National Center for Answering Sharia Questions of the Islamic Propaganda Office of Khorasan Razavi, Mashhad, Iran. Journal Article 2024 12 08 In the jurisprudential and fatwā literature of the fuqahāʾ (Islamic jurists), ambiguities persist regarding the timing of zakāt obligation on the four types of grains, particularly dates. These ambiguities have made it difficult to provide precise answers to related questions. Consequently, there is a critical need to examine the principles and criteria used by jurists in determining the zakāt due date for grains, especially the criterion of badw al-ṣalāḥ for dates. The first key question is: What exactly do jurists mean by badw al-ṣalāḥ, and when does this condition apply? Additionally, is badw al-ṣalāḥ distinct from the application of the term tamr (ripe dates)? In some cases, jurists have proposed iḥmirār (reddening) or iṣfirār (yellowing) as criteria for zakāt obligation. It remains unclear, however, what these terms precisely signify and whether they differ in meaning from badw al-ṣalāḥ or the application of the term tamr. This study first analyzes the terminologies used by jurists to define the timing of zakāt obligation. Next, it clarifies the precise meanings of these jurisprudential terms before examining their similarities and differences. Finally, by presenting a clear and well-reasoned conclusion, the study provides jurisprudential experts with a structured framework for addressing related questions. This enables them to offer scientifically grounded, rigorously examined, and substantiated responses based on a thorough understanding of the issue. In the jurisprudential and fatwā literature of the fuqahāʾ (Islamic jurists), ambiguities persist regarding the timing of zakāt obligation on the four types of grains, particularly dates. These ambiguities have made it difficult to provide precise answers to related questions. Consequently, there is a critical need to examine the principles and criteria used by jurists in determining the zakāt due date for grains, especially the criterion of badw al-ṣalāḥ for dates. The first key question is: What exactly do jurists mean by badw al-ṣalāḥ, and when does this condition apply? Additionally, is badw al-ṣalāḥ distinct from the application of the term tamr (ripe dates)? In some cases, jurists have proposed iḥmirār (reddening) or iṣfirār (yellowing) as criteria for zakāt obligation. It remains unclear, however, what these terms precisely signify and whether they differ in meaning from badw al-ṣalāḥ or the application of the term tamr. This study first analyzes the terminologies used by jurists to define the timing of zakāt obligation. Next, it clarifies the precise meanings of these jurisprudential terms before examining their similarities and differences. Finally, by presenting a clear and well-reasoned conclusion, the study provides jurisprudential experts with a structured framework for addressing related questions. This enables them to offer scientifically grounded, rigorously examined, and substantiated responses based on a thorough understanding of the issue.

http://jostar-fiqh.maalem.ir/article_77025_ad43000d2191a3c6c9f2e9e5eb656e1c.pdf

Islamic Propagation Office of Qom Seminary, Khorasan Razavi Branch Journal of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence 2476-7565 11 1 2025 05 22 Jurisprudential Considerations of Stock Endowment and Its Implementation in the Capital Market Jurisprudential Considerations of Stock Endowment and Its Implementation in the Capital Market 125 157 77738 10.22034/jrj.2025.68929.2805 FA Mohamad Amin Mosaddeq Howzeh qom Mahdi Zowqi Howzeh qom Hadi Zowqi Howzeh Yousof Salahi Howzeh qom Mohamad Naseri Howzeh qom 0009-0009-5968-7138 Journal Article 2024 05 12 The expansion of human societies and economic advancements has led to new financial instruments and assets, including stocks and cryptocurrencies. These developments present new opportunities for endowment (waqf) practices, particularly through the endowment of company stocks. However, Islamic jurisprudence requires specific conditions for valid endowments, including that the endowed property must be tangible (ʿayn), capable of preservation while allowing benefit, and prohibited from sale. This necessitates a jurisprudential examination of stock endowment and its implementation in capital markets. Regarding the nature of stock, analysis reveals it to be a credit property representing a share of a company’s secondary capital. By redefining waqf as “the confinement of property while permitting the utilization of its benefits,” and through either challenging the evidence for the tangible property requirement or expanding the interpretation of ʿayn to include credit properties, religious (sharʿī) endowment of stocks becomes theoretically acceptable. An alternative approach is “customary (ʿurfī) endowment,” which adopts the term waqf but operates outside strict jurisprudential rulings. A key challenge is reconciling the prohibition against selling endowed property with the primary benefit of stocks – profit through trading. Potential solutions include specific conditions set by the endower (wāqif) at the time of endowment or exceptions when maintaining the stock becomes unprofitable The expansion of human societies and economic advancements has led to new financial instruments and assets, including stocks and cryptocurrencies. These developments present new opportunities for endowment (waqf) practices, particularly through the endowment of company stocks. However, Islamic jurisprudence requires specific conditions for valid endowments, including that the endowed property must be tangible (ʿayn), capable of preservation while allowing benefit, and prohibited from sale. This necessitates a jurisprudential examination of stock endowment and its implementation in capital markets. Regarding the nature of stock, analysis reveals it to be a credit property representing a share of a company’s secondary capital. By redefining waqf as “the confinement of property while permitting the utilization of its benefits,” and through either challenging the evidence for the tangible property requirement or expanding the interpretation of ʿayn to include credit properties, religious (sharʿī) endowment of stocks becomes theoretically acceptable. An alternative approach is “customary (ʿurfī) endowment,” which adopts the term waqf but operates outside strict jurisprudential rulings. A key challenge is reconciling the prohibition against selling endowed property with the primary benefit of stocks – profit through trading. Potential solutions include specific conditions set by the endower (wāqif) at the time of endowment or exceptions when maintaining the stock becomes unprofitable

http://jostar-fiqh.maalem.ir/article_77738_1bce187aba386f1a6138b938a2b492a9.pdf

Islamic Propagation Office of Qom Seminary, Khorasan Razavi Branch Journal of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence 2476-7565 11 1 2025 05 22 A Feasibility Study of Recovering Damages Exceeding Dīyah Through Financial Taʿzīr of the Offender A Feasibility Study of Recovering Damages Exceeding Dīyah Through Financial Taʿzīr of the Offender 159 192 77737 10.22034/jrj.2025.70029.2879 FA Sajjad Davarpanah Moqaddam Assistant Professor, Department of Jurisprudence and Fundamentals of Islamic Law, Faculty of Theology, Hakim Sabzevari University, Sabzevar, Iran. Journal Article 2024 10 09 Dīyah (blood money) constitutes an established ruling in Islamic law, payable to victims or their heirs in cases of unintentional harm. Since its incorporation into Iran’s post-revolution legal system, a key jurisprudential debate has concerned compensation for damages exceeding the fixed dīyah amount. This study examines the legitimacy of recovering such excess damages through financial taʿzīr (discretionary punishment) imposed on offenders. Through descriptive-analytical methodology, this research reveals significant weaknesses in both the evidentiary basis (sanadī) and interpretive validity of narrations used to justify financial taʿzīr in such cases. The principle of al-taʿzīr bimā yarāh al-ḥākim (discretionary punishment at the judge’s discretion) proves thematically inapplicable to this context. Four substantive arguments support the impermissibility position: 1) The fixed, non-negotiable nature of dīyah under Islamic law 2) The prohibition against double punishment 3) The principle of non-authority (ʻadam al-wilāyah) over offenders 4) The principle of innocence (birāʼah) absent contradictory evidence Given the strength of these arguments, the study concludes that adjusting dīyah values to reflect real economic worth – supported by public or community institutions – represents the only shariʿah-compliant solution for adequate victim compensation, rather than imposing additional financial taʿzīr on offenders. Dīyah (blood money) constitutes an established ruling in Islamic law, payable to victims or their heirs in cases of unintentional harm. Since its incorporation into Iran’s post-revolution legal system, a key jurisprudential debate has concerned compensation for damages exceeding the fixed dīyah amount. This study examines the legitimacy of recovering such excess damages through financial taʿzīr (discretionary punishment) imposed on offenders. Through descriptive-analytical methodology, this research reveals significant weaknesses in both the evidentiary basis (sanadī) and interpretive validity of narrations used to justify financial taʿzīr in such cases. The principle of al-taʿzīr bimā yarāh al-ḥākim (discretionary punishment at the judge’s discretion) proves thematically inapplicable to this context. Four substantive arguments support the impermissibility position: 1) The fixed, non-negotiable nature of dīyah under Islamic law 2) The prohibition against double punishment 3) The principle of non-authority (ʻadam al-wilāyah) over offenders 4) The principle of innocence (birāʼah) absent contradictory evidence Given the strength of these arguments, the study concludes that adjusting dīyah values to reflect real economic worth – supported by public or community institutions – represents the only shariʿah-compliant solution for adequate victim compensation, rather than imposing additional financial taʿzīr on offenders.

http://jostar-fiqh.maalem.ir/article_77737_af7b840aaa030db8f06c696346a29892.pdf

Islamic Propagation Office of Qom Seminary, Khorasan Razavi Branch Journal of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence 2476-7565 11 1 2025 05 22 Assessing the possibility of receiving Damages Exceeding Diyah Through the Financial Ta'zir of the Perpetrator Assessing the possibility of receiving Damages Exceeding Diyah Through the Financial Ta'zir of the Perpetrator 193 212 77296 10.22034/jrj.2025.71225.2952 FA Ehsan Khamechi Master of Arts in Jurisprudence and Criminal Law, Shahed University, Tehran, Iran- PhD student in Criminal Law and Criminology, Islamic Azad University, Central Tehran Branch Mostafa Masoudian Assistant Professor of the Department of Fiqh and of Islamic Law, Shahid University ,Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2025 02 26 "Diyah" is one of the endorsed decrees in Islam, which is paid to the victim or their family in return for unintentional crimes. After the concept of "Diyah" was reflected in the laws following the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the issue of how to pay damages exceeding the "Diyah" has consistently been a significant topic in scholarly circles. One approach to compensate for such damages is to obligate the perpetrator based on financial "Ta'zir" (discretionary punishment). Therefore, the central question of the present study is to examine the legitimacy of receiving these damages based on the "Ta'zir" of the perpetrator. The outcome of this descriptive-analytical research is that, considering the documentary or indicative flaws in the narrations cited to prove the permissibility of financial "Ta'zir" for the perpetrator, as well as the exclusion of the principle of "Ta'zir as the ruler sees fit" to substantiate this view, the arguments for the view of non-permissibility, namely, the fixed amount of "Diyah," the prohibition of double punishment, the principle of non-guardianship, and the principle of innocence, will be without opposition. Therefore, considering the soundness of the arguments for the view of non-permissibility, the only way to compensate for damages exceeding the "Diyah" is to actualize the rate of "Diyah" in accordance with the "Diyah" stipulated in Islamic law and to secure it through public institutions. "Diyah" is one of the endorsed decrees in Islam, which is paid to the victim or their family in return for unintentional crimes. After the concept of "Diyah" was reflected in the laws following the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the issue of how to pay damages exceeding the "Diyah" has consistently been a significant topic in scholarly circles. One approach to compensate for such damages is to obligate the perpetrator based on financial "Ta'zir" (discretionary punishment). Therefore, the central question of the present study is to examine the legitimacy of receiving these damages based on the "Ta'zir" of the perpetrator. The outcome of this descriptive-analytical research is that, considering the documentary or indicative flaws in the narrations cited to prove the permissibility of financial "Ta'zir" for the perpetrator, as well as the exclusion of the principle of "Ta'zir as the ruler sees fit" to substantiate this view, the arguments for the view of non-permissibility, namely, the fixed amount of "Diyah," the prohibition of double punishment, the principle of non-guardianship, and the principle of innocence, will be without opposition. Therefore, considering the soundness of the arguments for the view of non-permissibility, the only way to compensate for damages exceeding the "Diyah" is to actualize the rate of "Diyah" in accordance with the "Diyah" stipulated in Islamic law and to secure it through public institutions.

http://jostar-fiqh.maalem.ir/article_77296_4e36650071d7ac7991e5397907bdf482.pdf