Islamic Propagation Office of Qom Seminary, Khorasan Razavi Branch Journal of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence 2476-7565 11 4 2026 02 20 Jurisprudential Thematic Study Versus the Determination of the Effective Cause of the Ruling: A Critical Reconsideration of the Interpretative Analysis of Verbal Evidence Jurisprudential Thematic Study Versus the Determination of the Effective Cause of the Ruling: A Critical Reconsideration of the Interpretative Analysis of Verbal Evidence 7 38 79482 10.22034/jrj.2025.71263.2955 FA Hadi Jalali Asl Assistant Professor, Shahid Beheshti University, Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies, Department of Political Jurisprudence and Professor of advanced levels of Qom seminary Journal Article 2025 03 10 One of the principal challenges in inferring religious rulings (ḥukm al-sharʿī) from textual proofs lies in uncertainty concerning the semantic scope and implication of such evidence. In particular, given the instrumental role of reason (ʿaql) in interpreting transmitted sources, it may at times appear that the verbal formulations employed do not fully disclose the true intent of the Lawgiver (al-Shāriʿ). In order to move beyond the literal wording of verbal evidence (dalīl al-lafẓī) and attain a precise understanding, two primary approaches have been advanced: first, identifying the effective cause (manāṭ) of the ruling; and second, determining the true subject of the ruling together with its qualifying conditions (quyūd). Adopting a descriptive–analytical method, the present study examines the presuppositions and implications of the positions articulated by Uṣūlī scholars. It argues for reconsidering the role of thematic study, particularly in relation to the capacity to identify the restrictive aspect (ḥaythīyyah al-taqyīdīyyah) as distinct from the causal aspect (ḥaythīyyah al-taʿlīlīyyah) in the process of legal inference. The central aim is to clarify the methodological potential of thematic study within the practice of ijtihād. The findings indicate that determining the effective cause of a ruling through its ḥaythīyyah al-taʿlilīyyah faces significant rational and customary challenges. By contrast, common understanding plays a foundational role in uncovering the ḥaythīyyah al-taqyīdīyyah of a ruling—whether in clarifying conceptual meaning or in identifying contextual indicators and assessing the sufficiency of apparent meaning. Accordingly, the identification of the thematic dimensions of a ruling in analysing the indication (dalālah) of verbal evidence demonstrates greater methodological capacity than the direct pursuit of the ruling’s effective cause. This conclusion underscores the necessity of re-evaluating the function of thematic study within ijtihād in order to enhance the precision and quality of jurisprudential research. One of the principal challenges in inferring religious rulings (ḥukm al-sharʿī) from textual proofs lies in uncertainty concerning the semantic scope and implication of such evidence. In particular, given the instrumental role of reason (ʿaql) in interpreting transmitted sources, it may at times appear that the verbal formulations employed do not fully disclose the true intent of the Lawgiver (al-Shāriʿ). In order to move beyond the literal wording of verbal evidence (dalīl al-lafẓī) and attain a precise understanding, two primary approaches have been advanced: first, identifying the effective cause (manāṭ) of the ruling; and second, determining the true subject of the ruling together with its qualifying conditions (quyūd). Adopting a descriptive–analytical method, the present study examines the presuppositions and implications of the positions articulated by Uṣūlī scholars. It argues for reconsidering the role of thematic study, particularly in relation to the capacity to identify the restrictive aspect (ḥaythīyyah al-taqyīdīyyah) as distinct from the causal aspect (ḥaythīyyah al-taʿlīlīyyah) in the process of legal inference. The central aim is to clarify the methodological potential of thematic study within the practice of ijtihād. The findings indicate that determining the effective cause of a ruling through its ḥaythīyyah al-taʿlilīyyah faces significant rational and customary challenges. By contrast, common understanding plays a foundational role in uncovering the ḥaythīyyah al-taqyīdīyyah of a ruling—whether in clarifying conceptual meaning or in identifying contextual indicators and assessing the sufficiency of apparent meaning. Accordingly, the identification of the thematic dimensions of a ruling in analysing the indication (dalālah) of verbal evidence demonstrates greater methodological capacity than the direct pursuit of the ruling’s effective cause. This conclusion underscores the necessity of re-evaluating the function of thematic study within ijtihād in order to enhance the precision and quality of jurisprudential research.

Islamic Propagation Office of Qom Seminary, Khorasan Razavi Branch Journal of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence 2476-7565 11 4 2026 02 20 A Critical Examination of the Process and Presuppositions of Shaykh al-Anṣārī’s Ijtihādī Model in the Jurisprudence of Makāsib al-Muḥarramah A Critical Examination of the Process and Presuppositions of Shaykh al-Anṣārī’s Ijtihādī Model in the Jurisprudence of Makāsib al-Muḥarramah 39 78 79465 10.22034/jrj.2025.72237.3008 FA Nima Norouzi Department of Jurisprudence and Private Law, Faculty of Sciences and Education, Al-Mustafa Al-Alamiyah University, Qom Al-Sharif, Iran. Higher Levels, Qom Seminary, Qom Al-Sharif, Iran. Azizullah Fahimi Associate Professor, Department of Private Law, Faculty of Law, University of Qom, and lecturer in advanced and higher levels of Islamic jurisprudence at the Qom Seminary, Qom, Iran. Mohsen Faghihi Research Level Professor and member of the Seminary Teachers' Association, Qom Seminary, Qom Al-Sharif, Iran. Journal Article 2025 07 22 The work Makāsib al-Muḥarramah by Shaykh Murtaḍā al-Anṣārī is among the most foundational and influential texts in the Imāmī jurisprudence of transactions, and it occupies a distinguished position from the standpoint of ijtihādī methodology. The present study seeks to identify and analyse the structural features of Shaykh al-Anṣārī’s model of ijtihād in Makāsib al-Muḥarramah by examining three principal axes: the application of the principles of Uṣūl al-Fiqh in the process of legal inference (istinbāṭ), the systematic and rational analysis of transmitted evidence (adillah al-naqlīyyah), and the logical and sequential organization of jurisprudential discussions. Drawing upon authoritative commentaries on Makāsib by prominent jurists—including Muḥaqqiq al-ʿIrāqī, Muḥaqqiq al-Īrawānī, Sayyid al-Yazdī, Muḥaqqiq al-Khānsārī, Āyatullāh al-Khūʾī, and al-Shahīd al-Ṣadr—the study demonstrates that Shaykh al-Anṣārī, through integrating earlier and later methodological approaches and forging a deep connection between uṣūl and the jurisprudence of transactions, established an innovative and systematic model of ijtihād. Among his most significant methodological contributions are: The systematization of jurisprudential chapters; The precise delineation of points of dispute; The logical ordering of the stages of legal inference; The formulation of a general theory of contracts (al-ʿuqūd) as a comprehensive framework for analysing obligational relationships. The findings indicate that Shaykh al-Anṣārī, by presenting a rational, structured, and coherent model, transformed the jurisprudence of transactions from a predominantly textual and fragmented discourse into an analytical and systematic discipline. In doing so, he laid the groundwork for the development of a renewed ijtihādī methodology within the seminaries. In its concluding section, the study critically evaluates his views concerning ownership and rationally legitimate benefit, assesses the capacity of his methodological framework to address newly emerging economic and social issues, and clarifies its influence on redefining contemporary instances of Makāsib al-Muḥarramah. The work Makāsib al-Muḥarramah by Shaykh Murtaḍā al-Anṣārī is among the most foundational and influential texts in the Imāmī jurisprudence of transactions, and it occupies a distinguished position from the standpoint of ijtihādī methodology. The present study seeks to identify and analyse the structural features of Shaykh al-Anṣārī’s model of ijtihād in Makāsib al-Muḥarramah by examining three principal axes: the application of the principles of Uṣūl al-Fiqh in the process of legal inference (istinbāṭ), the systematic and rational analysis of transmitted evidence (adillah al-naqlīyyah), and the logical and sequential organization of jurisprudential discussions. Drawing upon authoritative commentaries on Makāsib by prominent jurists—including Muḥaqqiq al-ʿIrāqī, Muḥaqqiq al-Īrawānī, Sayyid al-Yazdī, Muḥaqqiq al-Khānsārī, Āyatullāh al-Khūʾī, and al-Shahīd al-Ṣadr—the study demonstrates that Shaykh al-Anṣārī, through integrating earlier and later methodological approaches and forging a deep connection between uṣūl and the jurisprudence of transactions, established an innovative and systematic model of ijtihād. Among his most significant methodological contributions are: The systematization of jurisprudential chapters; The precise delineation of points of dispute; The logical ordering of the stages of legal inference; The formulation of a general theory of contracts (al-ʿuqūd) as a comprehensive framework for analysing obligational relationships. The findings indicate that Shaykh al-Anṣārī, by presenting a rational, structured, and coherent model, transformed the jurisprudence of transactions from a predominantly textual and fragmented discourse into an analytical and systematic discipline. In doing so, he laid the groundwork for the development of a renewed ijtihādī methodology within the seminaries. In its concluding section, the study critically evaluates his views concerning ownership and rationally legitimate benefit, assesses the capacity of his methodological framework to address newly emerging economic and social issues, and clarifies its influence on redefining contemporary instances of Makāsib al-Muḥarramah.

http://jostar-fiqh.maalem.ir/article_79465_c6b6e1c606da1eb48d5c5c6f6c7d1933.pdf

Islamic Propagation Office of Qom Seminary, Khorasan Razavi Branch Journal of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence 2476-7565 11 4 2026 02 20 A Comparative Jurisprudential Study of the Due Date of Zakāt on Wheat and Barley within a Responsiveness-Oriented Fiqh Framework A Comparative Jurisprudential Study of the Due Date of Zakāt on Wheat and Barley within a Responsiveness-Oriented Fiqh Framework 79 111 79659 10.22034/jrj.2025.70096.2886 FA Seyyedabbas Dianatmoghaddam High-level professor at Qom Seminary. Qom. Iran. s.a.dianat@gmail.com; Journal Article 2025 02 24 In the ijtihādī and fatwāī works of jurists, ambiguities persist regarding the due date of zakāt on the four cereals—wheat, barley, dates, and raisins—thereby complicating practical guidance. The central question of this study is: what principles and criteria do jurists employ in determining the point at which zakāt becomes due on wheat and barley? In particular, terms such as inqiʿād (formation) and ishtidād al-ḥabb (hardening or ripening of the grain) are invoked in reference to wheat and barley; what precisely do these terms denote, and may they be regarded as alternative expressions of the legal notion of ṣidq al-ism (the applicability of the designation)? Furthermore, if a jurist adopts badw al-ṣalāḥ (initial emergence of suitability) as the criterion for the obligation of zakāt, at what stage is this criterion practically realized? Despite apparent similarities in foundational principles among certain jurists, their issued fatāwā differ. With respect to the time at which zakāt becomes obligatory on wheat and barley, two principal criteria are commonly identified: the applicability of the name (ṣidq al-ism) “wheat” and “barley,” and ishtidād al-ḥabb. However, the assumption that these two criteria are identical is imprecise. Moreover, the determination of the time of obligation by some jurists involves elements of subject-matter assessment, which, as such, do not necessarily constitute binding proof (ḥujjah) for the legally responsible individual (mukallaf). The divergence of opinion between Imām Khomaynī and Āyatullāh al-Sīstānī concerning the consumption of wheat and barley prior to drying—where one holds that zakāt remains due on produce consumed at that stage and the other does not, despite shared foundational premises—appears to stem from differing jurisprudential interpretations. According to Imām Khomaynī, the applicability of the designation “wheat” or “barley” is realized when the crop becomes ready for harvest. By contrast, in the view of Āyatullāh al-Sīstānī, ishtidād al-ḥabb, which occurs prior to harvest, suffices for the designation to apply, even if the crop has not yet reached full harvest readiness. In the ijtihādī and fatwāī works of jurists, ambiguities persist regarding the due date of zakāt on the four cereals—wheat, barley, dates, and raisins—thereby complicating practical guidance. The central question of this study is: what principles and criteria do jurists employ in determining the point at which zakāt becomes due on wheat and barley? In particular, terms such as inqiʿād (formation) and ishtidād al-ḥabb (hardening or ripening of the grain) are invoked in reference to wheat and barley; what precisely do these terms denote, and may they be regarded as alternative expressions of the legal notion of ṣidq al-ism (the applicability of the designation)? Furthermore, if a jurist adopts badw al-ṣalāḥ (initial emergence of suitability) as the criterion for the obligation of zakāt, at what stage is this criterion practically realized? Despite apparent similarities in foundational principles among certain jurists, their issued fatāwā differ. With respect to the time at which zakāt becomes obligatory on wheat and barley, two principal criteria are commonly identified: the applicability of the name (ṣidq al-ism) “wheat” and “barley,” and ishtidād al-ḥabb. However, the assumption that these two criteria are identical is imprecise. Moreover, the determination of the time of obligation by some jurists involves elements of subject-matter assessment, which, as such, do not necessarily constitute binding proof (ḥujjah) for the legally responsible individual (mukallaf). The divergence of opinion between Imām Khomaynī and Āyatullāh al-Sīstānī concerning the consumption of wheat and barley prior to drying—where one holds that zakāt remains due on produce consumed at that stage and the other does not, despite shared foundational premises—appears to stem from differing jurisprudential interpretations. According to Imām Khomaynī, the applicability of the designation “wheat” or “barley” is realized when the crop becomes ready for harvest. By contrast, in the view of Āyatullāh al-Sīstānī, ishtidād al-ḥabb, which occurs prior to harvest, suffices for the designation to apply, even if the crop has not yet reached full harvest readiness.

Islamic Propagation Office of Qom Seminary, Khorasan Razavi Branch Journal of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence 2476-7565 11 4 2026 02 20 The Fundamental Challenges Concerning the Legitimacy of Forex Futures Transactions in Imāmī Jurisprudence The Fundamental Challenges Concerning the Legitimacy of Forex Futures Transactions in Imāmī Jurisprudence 113 146 78580 10.22034/jrj.2025.71597.2975 FA Mohsen Yusefi Institute of Islamic Jurisprudence and Sciences Journal Article 2025 04 26 The foreign exchange (Forex) market, as the largest financial market in the world, records a daily turnover exceeding six trillion US dollars, a substantial portion of which relates to currency futures transactions conducted through futures contracts and forward agreements. Given the importance of such transactions for risk management and exchange-rate stabilization, examining their legitimacy within Imāmī jurisprudence is of considerable significance. Within the structure of the Forex market operating in Iran—particularly in certain private brokerage firms—there is often no direct linkage to the international interbank market. Even where such a connection is claimed, no actual transfer or delivery of currency occurs; rather, only price differentials are settled. This reality, whether framed in a promissory (ʿahdī) model—based on a commitment to transact in the future—or in a proprietary (milkī) model—potentially falling under the category of bayʿ al-kālīʾ bi al-kālīʾ (deferred-for-deferred sale)—gives rise to several jurisprudential objections. These include fictitiousness (form without substantive exchange), wrongful appropriation of property (akl al-māl bi al-bāṭil), and the non-binding character of preliminary undertakings. Adopting an analytical and inferential approach grounded in the sources of Imāmī jurisprudence, the present study argues that, in the promissory (ʿahdī) model, the absence of genuine contractual intent constitutes a fundamental obstacle to validity, while in the proprietary (milkī) model, the prohibition associated with deferred-for-deferred sale presents a significant impediment. Nevertheless, through juristic restructuring of the settlement mechanism, the establishment of a Sharʿī-compliant clearinghouse, and recourse to alternative contractual forms (ʿuqūd)—such as stipulations within a contract (sharṭ ḍimn al-ʿaqd), conditional salaf, and obligational compromise (muṣālaḥah al-taʿahhudīyyah)—it may be possible to align certain forms of such transactions with the principles of Imāmī jurisprudence. The foreign exchange (Forex) market, as the largest financial market in the world, records a daily turnover exceeding six trillion US dollars, a substantial portion of which relates to currency futures transactions conducted through futures contracts and forward agreements. Given the importance of such transactions for risk management and exchange-rate stabilization, examining their legitimacy within Imāmī jurisprudence is of considerable significance. Within the structure of the Forex market operating in Iran—particularly in certain private brokerage firms—there is often no direct linkage to the international interbank market. Even where such a connection is claimed, no actual transfer or delivery of currency occurs; rather, only price differentials are settled. This reality, whether framed in a promissory (ʿahdī) model—based on a commitment to transact in the future—or in a proprietary (milkī) model—potentially falling under the category of bayʿ al-kālīʾ bi al-kālīʾ (deferred-for-deferred sale)—gives rise to several jurisprudential objections. These include fictitiousness (form without substantive exchange), wrongful appropriation of property (akl al-māl bi al-bāṭil), and the non-binding character of preliminary undertakings. Adopting an analytical and inferential approach grounded in the sources of Imāmī jurisprudence, the present study argues that, in the promissory (ʿahdī) model, the absence of genuine contractual intent constitutes a fundamental obstacle to validity, while in the proprietary (milkī) model, the prohibition associated with deferred-for-deferred sale presents a significant impediment. Nevertheless, through juristic restructuring of the settlement mechanism, the establishment of a Sharʿī-compliant clearinghouse, and recourse to alternative contractual forms (ʿuqūd)—such as stipulations within a contract (sharṭ ḍimn al-ʿaqd), conditional salaf, and obligational compromise (muṣālaḥah al-taʿahhudīyyah)—it may be possible to align certain forms of such transactions with the principles of Imāmī jurisprudence.

http://jostar-fiqh.maalem.ir/article_78580_779d45c85bf7f1aca68adc55a1a61d5f.pdf

Islamic Propagation Office of Qom Seminary, Khorasan Razavi Branch Journal of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence 2476-7565 11 4 2026 02 20 Distribution of non-financial obligations of the heir to the heirs from the perspective of Imamiyyah jurisprudence and Iranian law Distribution of non-financial obligations of the heir to the heirs from the perspective of Imamiyyah jurisprudence and Iranian law 147 180 79660 10.22034/jrj.2025.72575.3032 FA Ehsan Hazratzadeh Level (4) Scholar of Jurisprudence and Private Law, Specialized Center for Jurisprudence and Law, Qom, Iran. Journal Article 2025 08 27 During the course of life, a person incurs various obligations through contracts, unilateral juridical acts, and legal events. Certain obligations are intrinsically personal in nature and, due to their dependence upon the specific characteristics or capacities of the obligor, are extinguished upon death. By contrast, another category of obligations lacks an inherently personal character, and their performance does not depend upon the individual attributes of the obligor. The principal question addressed in this study is whether, upon the obligor’s death, such obligations are transferred to the heirs or instead lapse entirely. Employing a library-based research method and adopting a descriptive, analytical, and critical approach, this study demonstrates that three principal theories have been advanced concerning the legal nature of the estate in Imāmī jurisprudence and Iranian law: (1) the continuance of the decedent’s ownership after death; (2) the immediate transfer of ownership to the heirs; and (3) the recognition of the estate as an independent juridical entity. The first theory is primarily grounded in Qurʼānic verses, narrations (ḥadīth), and the consensus (ijmāʿ) of jurists. The second theory, in addition to these sources, relies upon jurisprudential maxims such as the principle that “property cannot remain without an owner” (al-māl lā yabqā bilā mālik). The third theory—shaped in part by comparative engagement with Western legal systems—emphasizes the precise determination of the moment of transfer and the suspension of the heirs’ right of disposition until the completion of estate administration and settlement. The analytical conclusion of this study is that, through a synthesis of these three perspectives, the notion of a temporary juridical personality of the estate can be derived within Imāmī jurisprudence. According to this view, the property of the deceased acquires an independent legal status from the moment of death until the completion of settlement procedures. Only after the discharge of debts and obligations does definitive ownership transfer to the heirs. The findings further indicate that pecuniary debts are transferable and are satisfied from the estate prior to distribution. Non-pecuniary obligations, however, due to their intrinsically personal character, are extinguished upon the death of the deceased, even where they entail incidental financial consequences. In this respect, the Iranian legal system appears to confront a legislative lacuna concerning the treatment of the deceased’s non-pecuniary obligations, resulting in divergent doctrinal opinions and practical challenges within judicial practice. During the course of life, a person incurs various obligations through contracts, unilateral juridical acts, and legal events. Certain obligations are intrinsically personal in nature and, due to their dependence upon the specific characteristics or capacities of the obligor, are extinguished upon death. By contrast, another category of obligations lacks an inherently personal character, and their performance does not depend upon the individual attributes of the obligor. The principal question addressed in this study is whether, upon the obligor’s death, such obligations are transferred to the heirs or instead lapse entirely. Employing a library-based research method and adopting a descriptive, analytical, and critical approach, this study demonstrates that three principal theories have been advanced concerning the legal nature of the estate in Imāmī jurisprudence and Iranian law: (1) the continuance of the decedent’s ownership after death; (2) the immediate transfer of ownership to the heirs; and (3) the recognition of the estate as an independent juridical entity. The first theory is primarily grounded in Qurʼānic verses, narrations (ḥadīth), and the consensus (ijmāʿ) of jurists. The second theory, in addition to these sources, relies upon jurisprudential maxims such as the principle that “property cannot remain without an owner” (al-māl lā yabqā bilā mālik). The third theory—shaped in part by comparative engagement with Western legal systems—emphasizes the precise determination of the moment of transfer and the suspension of the heirs’ right of disposition until the completion of estate administration and settlement. The analytical conclusion of this study is that, through a synthesis of these three perspectives, the notion of a temporary juridical personality of the estate can be derived within Imāmī jurisprudence. According to this view, the property of the deceased acquires an independent legal status from the moment of death until the completion of settlement procedures. Only after the discharge of debts and obligations does definitive ownership transfer to the heirs. The findings further indicate that pecuniary debts are transferable and are satisfied from the estate prior to distribution. Non-pecuniary obligations, however, due to their intrinsically personal character, are extinguished upon the death of the deceased, even where they entail incidental financial consequences. In this respect, the Iranian legal system appears to confront a legislative lacuna concerning the treatment of the deceased’s non-pecuniary obligations, resulting in divergent doctrinal opinions and practical challenges within judicial practice.

http://jostar-fiqh.maalem.ir/article_79660_9b3c5d77bdc4da40cea2771c9aa3233a.pdf

Islamic Propagation Office of Qom Seminary, Khorasan Razavi Branch Journal of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence 2476-7565 11 4 2026 02 20 The Application of the Lease Contract in the Transfer of Mining Exploitation Rights The Application of the Lease Contract in the Transfer of Mining Exploitation Rights 181 209 79624 10.22034/jrj.2025.72441.3020 FA Mohammad Ghodsi Researcher in the field of Islamic Economic Jurisprudence at the Institute of Advanced Fiqh and Islamic Sciences. Journal Article 2025 09 02 The exploitation of mines, as a significant source of public wealth, is frequently entrusted to specialized individuals by the owners or lawful custodians of such resources. One potential legal framework for this transfer is the lease contract (ijārah). The principal question addressed in this study is whether the exploitation of mines, in light of its particular characteristics, may be undertaken within the framework of ijārah in accordance with the conditions governing its validity in Shīʿī jurisprudence. To this end, it is necessary to examine the compatibility of mining exploitation with the essential elements required for the validity of a lease contract. These include the non-consumptive nature of the leased object, the determinacy and definability of the benefit, the distinction between the benefit (manfaʿah) and the corporeal object (ʿayn), and the requirement that the subject matter of exchange be legally owned by one of the contracting parties. The findings indicate that, if customary criteria are applied in defining the benefit and the intrinsic continuity of the mine’s substance is presumed, the lease contract may serve as a valid juridical mechanism for transferring exploitation rights and even for enabling the direct acquisition of mineral resources. However, if the acquisition of mineral materials through ijārah is deemed impermissible, an alternative view may be adopted. According to this perspective, only the right of usufruct over the mineral land or the mine itself is transferred to the lessee. In such a case, the lessee acquires ownership of the extracted minerals either through acts of possession in the case of surface mines or through the reclamation and development of underground mines in accordance with the legal principles governing the acquisition of ownerless resources. The exploitation of mines, as a significant source of public wealth, is frequently entrusted to specialized individuals by the owners or lawful custodians of such resources. One potential legal framework for this transfer is the lease contract (ijārah). The principal question addressed in this study is whether the exploitation of mines, in light of its particular characteristics, may be undertaken within the framework of ijārah in accordance with the conditions governing its validity in Shīʿī jurisprudence. To this end, it is necessary to examine the compatibility of mining exploitation with the essential elements required for the validity of a lease contract. These include the non-consumptive nature of the leased object, the determinacy and definability of the benefit, the distinction between the benefit (manfaʿah) and the corporeal object (ʿayn), and the requirement that the subject matter of exchange be legally owned by one of the contracting parties. The findings indicate that, if customary criteria are applied in defining the benefit and the intrinsic continuity of the mine’s substance is presumed, the lease contract may serve as a valid juridical mechanism for transferring exploitation rights and even for enabling the direct acquisition of mineral resources. However, if the acquisition of mineral materials through ijārah is deemed impermissible, an alternative view may be adopted. According to this perspective, only the right of usufruct over the mineral land or the mine itself is transferred to the lessee. In such a case, the lessee acquires ownership of the extracted minerals either through acts of possession in the case of surface mines or through the reclamation and development of underground mines in accordance with the legal principles governing the acquisition of ownerless resources.

http://jostar-fiqh.maalem.ir/article_79624_532eb9c624ee14dde05d75f23d9ef1a0.pdf

Islamic Propagation Office of Qom Seminary, Khorasan Razavi Branch Journal of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence 2476-7565 11 4 2026 02 20 Feasibility of Legal Personality and the Legitimacy of Establishing a Conditional Right of Option for Artificial Intelligence Feasibility of Legal Personality and the Legitimacy of Establishing a Conditional Right of Option for Artificial Intelligence 211 237 78579 10.22034/jrj.2025.72567.3033 FA MohammadBager Panahi Jurisprudence and Law.Faculty of Theology.Farabi campus.University of Tehran.Qom.Iran Mohammad Hakim Jurisprudence and Law.Faculty of Theology.Farabi campus.University of Tehran.Qom.Iran Mohammad Adibymehr Jurisprudence and Law.Faculty of Theology.Farabi campus.University of Tehran.Qom.Iran Journal Article 2025 08 10 Rapid developments in modern technologies, particularly artificial intelligence (AI) and smart contracts, have generated new challenges for contemporary legal and jurisprudential systems. Among the most significant of these challenges is the applicability of traditional legal concepts grounded in human volition—such as establishment (jaʿl) and the exercise of conditional rights (khiyār al-sharṭ)—within the context of artificial intelligence. According to the consensus (ijmāʿ) of Shīʿī jurists and Article 399 of the Civil Code of Iran, the establishment of a right of option in favour of a third party is legally valid. artificial intelligence, as a contemporary instance of a “third party,” plays an increasingly prominent role in smart contracts through data processing and the automation of transactions. The principal question addressed in this study is whether the establishment of a right of option for artificial intelligence, as a third party, is legally and jurisprudentially valid. Employing a descriptive–analytical method, the study examines the legal personality of artificial intelligence, the role of intention and will in juridical acts, and the juridical nature of acceptance (qabūl) in contract formation. The findings suggest that artificial intelligence, when purposefully designed and institutionally structured, may be regarded as possessing a limited juridical personality. Moreover, on the basis of theories of intelligence-centred systems, such systems may be understood as capable of operationalizing the requisite intention and will for certain legal acts, including the exercise of a right of option. In this framework, human intention and will function as the higher-order source through which the system’s legal acts are manifested. Furthermore, the position adopted by jurists who define acceptance (qabūl) as the expression of consent supports the possibility of contract formation and the exercise of conditional rights by artificial intelligence. Accordingly, the establishment of a right of option in favour of artificial intelligence in smart transactions, through the design of appropriate algorithms, may be regarded as legally and jurisprudentially valid within the Iranian legal system. Rapid developments in modern technologies, particularly artificial intelligence (AI) and smart contracts, have generated new challenges for contemporary legal and jurisprudential systems. Among the most significant of these challenges is the applicability of traditional legal concepts grounded in human volition—such as establishment (jaʿl) and the exercise of conditional rights (khiyār al-sharṭ)—within the context of artificial intelligence. According to the consensus (ijmāʿ) of Shīʿī jurists and Article 399 of the Civil Code of Iran, the establishment of a right of option in favour of a third party is legally valid. artificial intelligence, as a contemporary instance of a “third party,” plays an increasingly prominent role in smart contracts through data processing and the automation of transactions. The principal question addressed in this study is whether the establishment of a right of option for artificial intelligence, as a third party, is legally and jurisprudentially valid. Employing a descriptive–analytical method, the study examines the legal personality of artificial intelligence, the role of intention and will in juridical acts, and the juridical nature of acceptance (qabūl) in contract formation. The findings suggest that artificial intelligence, when purposefully designed and institutionally structured, may be regarded as possessing a limited juridical personality. Moreover, on the basis of theories of intelligence-centred systems, such systems may be understood as capable of operationalizing the requisite intention and will for certain legal acts, including the exercise of a right of option. In this framework, human intention and will function as the higher-order source through which the system’s legal acts are manifested. Furthermore, the position adopted by jurists who define acceptance (qabūl) as the expression of consent supports the possibility of contract formation and the exercise of conditional rights by artificial intelligence. Accordingly, the establishment of a right of option in favour of artificial intelligence in smart transactions, through the design of appropriate algorithms, may be regarded as legally and jurisprudentially valid within the Iranian legal system.

http://jostar-fiqh.maalem.ir/article_78579_4a8b2cc522470af38e6c50135ce52b16.pdf