The distinction between the principles and evidence of the Jurisprudence of judgment and The enjoining good in the thought of Allama Na'ini

According to some jurists, one of the ways to facilitate the establishment of rulings on the subject of judgment is to use the evidence of "commanding for the good". The common objectives of "enjoining good" and judgment, including eliminating and warding off chaos and establishing norms, and on the other hand, the generality and absoluteness of the evidence of "enjoining good" and the ability to interpret these evidence broadly, have provided such a requirement, without the restrictions and conditions being as great as the specific evidence of judgment before the jurist. The comparison or distinction of the arguments of judgment from "enjoining good" requires a thorough examination of the subject, limitations, principles, and axioms, which can create scope or narrowness for the Islamic ruler in the implementation of Sharia and the development of government affairs. In this research, focusing on the jurisprudential opinions of Allama Na'ini, the goal is to determine, first, how much argumentative strength the comparison or distinction of the arguments of these two categories has, and second, how much Allama Na'ini's system of political and jurisprudential thought, which requires the development of the active presence of Sharia in the field of politics and management (of which judgment is an example), is consistent in this specific issue. The findings of this descriptive-analytical research, with reference to library sources, indicate that his juristic approach is strictly text-bound and disciplined—he does not theorize or legitimize his political inclinations by merely anchoring them in juristic texts. Nāʾīnī distinguishes between the proofs of judgeship and those of enjoining good, and even in cases of necessity, he resorts to the principle of preserving social order and the authority of the believers' just leadership. This approach implies that departing from the specific conditions of judgeship remains exceptional.