نوع مقاله : مقالات سفارشی دارالعلم
نویسندگان
1 استادیار رشتۀ فقه و مبانی حقوق، دانشگاه پیام نور، تهران. ایران.
2 استادیار گروه حقوق، واحد هشترود، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی. هشترود. ایران.
3 دانشیار گروه فلسفه و حکمت اسلامی دانشگاه پیام نور، تهران. ایران.
4 پژوهشگر پژوهشکده فقه و مطالعات اجتماعی و مدرس سطح عالی مرکز مدیریت حوزه های علمیه. قم. ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژه‌ها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
This study offers a re-examination of Muḥaqqiq al-Iṣfahānī’s account of the nature of legal rulings and argues that a Sharīʿa ruling is neither a purely mental state nor merely a conventional or linguistic entity. Rather, it is a performative, action-oriented act which, through command and prohibition by virtue of instituting a motivating reason, brings about a new normative status for the legally responsible agent.
The paper first distinguishes, through a comparative analysis, three dominant approaches to legal rulings—expression-centered, will-centered, and conventionalist—and clarifies the distinctive features of al-Iṣfahānī’s position vis-à-vis these accounts. It then addresses the central objection that obligation lacks validity in the absence of a mental will on the part of the Legislator. This objection is answered by appeal to two contemporary frameworks.
Within modal normativism, the language of ought and ought-not functions as a vehicle for stabilizing and transmitting rules. Within easy ontology, juridical institutional entities—from the ruling itself to institutions such as ownership and prohibition—come into existence through valid enactment and collective acceptance, without requiring heavy metaphysical commitments.
Accordingly, separating will from enactment does not undermine normative bindingness; rather, it is a necessary condition for an objective understanding of obedience and disobedience. Methodologically, the study relies on a comparative analysis of foundational uṣūlī texts and a reconstruction of al-Iṣfahānī’s theoretical commitments in light of these two frameworks.
The findings include: proposing criteria for distinguishing authoritative rulings from guidance-oriented enactments; explaining the mechanism of obedience and the grounding of reward and punishment in terms of institutions and rules; and clarifying the applicability of this theory to emerging legal issues. The article’s central contribution lies in connecting al-Iṣfahānī’s account with these contemporary approaches and articulating a conception of the legal ruling as a normative action.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
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